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Effects of Network Segregation in Intergroup Conflict: An
Experimental Analysis1
Károly Takács2 
University of Groningen 
Dense  in-group and scarce out-group relations (network segregation) often support the emergence of conflicts between groups.
A key underlying mechanism is social control that helps to overcome the collective action problem within groups, but
contributes to harmful conflicts among them in segregated settings. In this study, a new experimental design is introduced to
test whether internalized social control affects contribution decisions in intergroup related collective action. Subjects played
single-shot Intergroup Public Good games in two groups of five without communication. Subjects were connected via
computers and connection patterns were manipulated to detect forms of social control that are activated conditional on
expectations and on the composition of the artificially created ego-network. Results confirm the influence of behavioral
confirmation and the conditional impact of internalized selective incentives. As an aggregated consequence of these social
control effects, harmful intergroup outcomes were least likely when members of the groups were arranged in a mixed network.
INTRODUCTION 
Single-shot social dilemma experiments consistently find
nonzero cooperation rates. A lot of people act against their
egoistic interests and make sacrifices for the collectivity also
in strictly impersonal settings in which no communication is
allowed and subjects are completely strangers to each other.
In a competition situation with another group, experiments
find even higher contribution rates to the provision of a
public good (Bornstein, Erev, and Rosen, 1990; Schopler
and Insko, 1992; Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Insko et
al., 1994; Bornstein, Winter, and Goren, 1996). When
intense intergroup competition leads to negative conse-
quences for members of both groups, public “bads” are pro-
vided instead of public goods. Why do people still act in
favor of their groups under such circumstances? 
This paper argues that the monetary payoff structure of
experimental games does not fully describe the incentives of
subjects in the laboratory. The emphasis here will be on the
role of incentives that stem from interpersonal relations and
social networks. The importance of social networks in social
dilemmas was highlighted by both theoretical (e.g., Marwell,
Oliver, and Prahl, 1988; Gould, 1993; Flache and Macy,
1996; Chwe, 1999) and empirical studies (e.g., McAdam,
1986; Chong, 1991; Finkel and Opp, 1991; Gould, 1995;
Sandell and Stern, 1998). Network effects are attributed to
the fact that individuals are influenced by the presence,
opinion, expectations, and behavior of friends, neighbors,
colleagues, and relevant others, when they decide to partici-
pate in collective action. These mechanisms can be summa-
rized as social control (cf. Kornhauser, 1978; Gibbs, 1981;
Black, 1984; Heckathorn, 1990; 1993; Macy, 1993;
Villareal, 2002). 
Only a limited amount of studies have tried, however, to
describe and measure these effects in a controlled environ-
ment (some indications are given for the presence of social
control by Yamagishi, 1986; van de Kragt, Dawes, and
Orbell, 1988; Rapoport, Bornstein, and Erev, 1989; McCus-
ker and Carnevale, 1995; Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Rege and
Telle, 2004). Structural considerations were disregarded by
previous experiments on intergroup relations (an exception
is Grö $er and Schram, 2006). In general, the experimental
literature that takes account of networks is limited but
growing (for an overview, see Kosfeld, 2003). These avenues
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should be pursued to gain further insights into determinants
of individual behavior in social dilemmas. This paper argues
that social control in certain forms and also elementary
structures might be present in the laboratory and can make
a significant difference to contribution decisions, even when
subjects do not know each other and are not allowed to
communicate. 
As a model of intergroup relations, an extension of the
Intergroup Public Goods (IPG) game (Rapoport and Born-
stein, 1987; Takács, 2001) will be used that represents the
dichotomy of interdependencies within the groups (provision
of a public good) and between the groups (intergroup com-
petition for a scarce resource). In this game, players are
divided in two groups. Every player can decide to contribute
or not to the provision of a public good. Contribution is
costly. The number of contributors is compared between the
groups. All members of the group with more contributors
receive a public good reward v and all members of the other
group receive a “public bad” d. In case the number of contri-
butors are equal, all players receive a punishment reward c
(v>0>c>d). The IPG game in this form is intended to
model group competitions such as civil war, conflicts be-
tween pupil groups, fights between football supporters or
urban gangs. 
In case of only few contributors, nothing happens, the status
quo is preserved. It means that if both groups have less
contributors than a minimal contributing set (MCS), no
public good or bad is provided (cf. van de Kragt, Orbell, and
Dawes, 1983). In this paper, an outcome will be called inter-
group conflict, if one or both of the groups receive negative
public rewards (c or d), or equivalently, the number of con-
tributors at least in one group is above the threshold (MCS).
Assuming no other incentives, the outcome of this game
should not depend on the network connections group mem-
bers might have between each other. 
In order to capture relevant network effects, the IPG model
has been extended by assuming dyadic mechanisms of social
selective incentives and behavioral confirmation (Takács,
2001). These forms of social control have been shown to be
possible underlying mechanisms why social networks might
influence the likelihood of intergroup conflict. The extended
model predicts that in particular, network segregation affects
the likelihood of intergroup conflict and the relationship can
be characterized by an S-shape function. This implies that
segregation is likely to promote intergroup conflict, but in
extreme ranges of segregation, an additional change does not
result in an increase in the likelihood of conflict (Takács,
2001). These theoretical predictions directly lead to the
main question and hypothesis of this study. In the context of
a laboratory environment, is intergroup conflict indeed more
likely when group members are arranged in a segregated
network? 
SOCIAL CONTROL AND NETWORK EFFECTS IN
EXPERIMENTS 
This study will examine what forms of social control back
the effect of network segregation on intergroup conflict, if
there is any. It will be explored in controlled experimental
conditions what forms of internalized social control influ-
ence the decision of subjects to contribute or not to the
provision of intergroup public goods. 
The following fundamental forms of social control will be
considered as possible mechanisms. In-group social selective
incentives, such as prestige, respect, and status either reward
those who contributed to the group welfare (e.g., Lovaglia,
Willer, and Troyer, 2003) or punish those who did not make
contributions. Empirical studies show that social selective
incentives are disseminated mainly locally, through interper-
sonal relations (Sandell and Stern, 1998) and are often
internalized as contribution norms that create a cognitive
reward for cooperation (Scott, 1971; Kornhauser, 1978;
Coleman, 1990: 293). Individuals feel rewarded when they
“did the right thing for the group” (Opp, 1989). 
A similar form of social control is present in network rela-
tions with out-group members. Members of the competing
groups, however, have contradictory interests in intergroup
competition and therefore they reward each other’s action
that is against the in-group interest (e.g., Kuran, 1995, 9-
10). These relations therefore transmit social selective in-
centives that punish contribution and reward defection.
Out-group selective incentives are also likely to be internal-
ized as a fear from dyadic conflict and benefit for local har-
mony. Their relevance can provide an explanation why
contact can help to normalize intergroup relations (cf.
Allport, 1954). 
Another prominent form of social control is behavioral
confirmation that expresses the desire to conform to the
expected behavior of relevant individuals. It means that
doing the same as relevant others has a positive value by
itself and increases the utility of both sides independently
from future interactions. In empirical collective action situa-
tions (e.g., strikes, demonstrations, and revolutions) partici-
pation in collective political action can be largely explained
by willingness to conform to the behavioral expectations of
relevant others (e.g., Finkel and Opp, 1991; Chong, 1991;
Oberschall, 1994). There is indication for the relevance of
such a mechanism also in public good experiments
(Yamagishi, 1986; McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; Rege
and Telle, 2004). Behavioral confirmation has a two-fold
effect: confirmation by participating in-group alters provides
an incentive for contribution and confirmation by free riders
works against contribution. Even if others are not able to
monitor individual choice, behavioral confirmation might
affect decisions as an internalized mechanism or imitation
strategy (Asch, 1956; Dawkins, 1976; Pingle, 1995). 
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As an aggregated consequence of dyadic social control, the
network structure of individual relations influences the
likelihood of intergroup conflict. Dense in-group relations
and scarce out-group relations are correlated with extensive
distribution of social selective incentives between in-group
members and limited realization of out-group selective in-
centives. Hence, network segregation supports contributions
to harmful intergroup competitions and consequently to the
emergence of harmful conflicts. The underlying mechanisms
responsible for this are the fundamental forms of social
control. 
A major difference compared to field situations is that sub-
jects are unknown to each other in the laboratory; conse-
quently there are no social network relations between them.
Can social control operate under such circumstances? 
Experimental evidence shows that face-to-face contact
facilitates cooperation in conflict situations (cf. Drolet and
Morris, 2000). Previously, this finding was explained by the
social psychological process of rapport that is conceptualized
as a “state of mutual positivity and interest that arises
through the convergence of nonverbal expressive behavior
in an interaction” (Drolet and Morris, 2000: 27; Tickle-
Degnen and Rosenthal, 1990). There is no doubt that when
subjects are able to communicate with nonverbal signs or are
able to send emotional signals, they influence the behavior
of each other in the social dilemma task. The question is
whether minimal contact and a “minimum network” have an
additional effect that is due to the activation of internalized
social control. 
HYPOTHESES AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Minimal contact and social control 
To test the presence of different forms of social control and
the segregation effect on intergroup conflict in a controlled
environment, a new experimental design is introduced. In
the experiments, the seating arrangement of subjects and
visibility conditions were manipulated in order to detect
forms of social control that are activated conditional on the
composition of the ego-network that is created experimen-
tally. Minimal contact was introduced between connected
subjects in the form that subjects were able to see to whom
they are connected and they were able to identify the group
membership of each other. Verbal and nonverbal communi-
cation was disallowed to avoid application of other forms of
social control and signaling. It was tested whether this mini-
mal contact is sufficient to activate internalized forms of
social control. 
In later parts of the experiments, additional to minimal
contact, monetary side-payments were introduced as repre-
sentations of external behavioral confirmation and in-group
selective incentives. These effects are expected to be stron-
ger than internalized effects. With their introduction a
meaningful comparison can be made between the size of
monetary and internalized social control. With regard to
forms of social control, the following hypotheses are expli-
cated. 
Selective incentives: In-group selective incentives have a
positive effect on contribution propensities. More connec-
tions to members of the in-group mean the distribution of
selective incentives from multiple sources. Hence, the higher
the number of in-group members in the ego-network, the
higher the contribution rate is. 
The presence of contacts to members of the opposite group
triggers a similar, but opposite effect. Internalized out-group
selective incentives have a negative effect on contribution
propensities. The higher the number of members of the
opposite group in the ego-network, the lower the contribu-
tion rate is. Because of its similarity with in-group selective
incentives, this form of social control was not introduced in
a monetary form in the experiments. 
The effect of behavioral confirmation is not only dependent
on the composition of the ego-network, but also on expected
decisions of alters. It is presumed that subjects do not make
qualitative differences between alters who are members of
the same group. 
Behavioral confirmation of in-group members: Behavioral con-
firmation is predicted to have an effect on contribution
propensities. The direction and the size of the effect depend
on the number of expected contributors and on the number
of expected defectors in the ego-network. If the former is
higher, the effect is positive. If the latter is higher, the effect
is negative. It is assumed that the size of the effect is a linear
function of the difference between the two. 
For the operationalization of behavioral confirmation, the
expectations of subjects were measured by asking them to
forecast the decision of their left and right neighbors before
every decision round. 
Network segregation and experimental
implementation 
Network connections are conceptualized as adjacency in the
seating configuration in the experiment. As neighbors are
expected to be the direct source of social control, different
neighborhood compositions would lead to different contrib-
ution propensities. At the aggregated level, different out-
comes can be predicted for different neighborhood struc-
tures. From the nature of the specified social control mecha-
nisms it follows that segregation is likely to promote inter-
group conflict (cf. Takács, 2001). On the basis of this theo-
retical prediction, the following hypothesis can be formu-
lated for the IPG experiments: 
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SEGREGATION HYPOTHESIS: In a segregated
structure, contribution rates will be higher and inter-
group conflict will be more likely than in a mixed struc-
ture or in a control condition with no networks. 
Furthermore, Takács (2001) also specified the impact of the
relative size of social control mechanisms on intergroup
conflict. As in-group selective incentives always drive to-
wards contribution and behavioral confirmation might drive
towards contribution as well as towards defection, the segre-
gation effect on intergroup conflict is stronger where in-
group selective incentives are relatively important when
compared to behavioral confirmation. In order to test this
theoretical prediction, in one experimental condition ex-
ternal in-group selective incentives and in another experi-
mental condition external behavioral confirmation were
introduced as additional monetary side-payments. On the
basis of the theoretical prediction, the hypothesis about
these effects is as follows: 
The segregation effect on the likelihood of intergroup
conflict will be stronger in the monetary selective incen-
tives condition than in the monetary behavioral confirm-
ation condition. 
Figure 1 Structural Conditions in the Experiments: Control
Condition, Low, Medium, and High Segregation. Note:  red
and green nodes indicate members of red and green group. In
the Control Group no color labels were introduced and panel
walls separated the subjects. 
To test the above hypotheses, three types of network ar-
rangements were implemented between sessions; with low,
medium, and high segregation (see Figure 1). In addition,
every experiment started with a control condition, in which
subjects made their decisions in isolation without the knowl-
edge of their group membership. After the control condition,
color labels indicating group membership were introduced
and subjects were arranged in one of the network conditions
(low, medium, or high segregation) that are shown in Figure
1. For instance, in the case of low segregation, all subjects in
the red group were seated next to members of the green
group. 
Subjects could see the composition of their ego-network on
their computer screen. This intervention is targeted to assess
internalized social control effects in the presence of minimal
contact. 
The IPG game and experimental implementation 
The experiment used a series of single-shot IPG games as a
model of competitive intergroup relations. The payoffs of the
game used in the experiment are outlined here. There were
two groups: the red group and the green group consisting of
five members each. Every player had to decide individually
whether to keep a bonus of 11 points completely (1 point
was equivalent to approximately 0.42 USD) or to give all of
it to help their group in the competition. Depending on the
number of contributors in the groups, public good and “bad”
rewards were distributed equally among all group members.
The sizes of these rewards in the experiments are shown in
Figure 2. Each member of the group with more contributors
received 15 points and each member of the group with less
contributors lost 15 points as long as there were at least
three contributors in the winning group (v=15; d=-15;
MCS=3). A minimal contributing set with three persons
was chosen in order to avoid that few coincidental contribu-
tions would have affected the result and in order to decrease
individual efficacy in the experiment. Less than three contri-
butions were insufficient to produce a public good and these
contributions were lost to these individuals. When the num-
ber of contributors was equal in the groups and was over the
minimal contributing set, all subjects lost 11 points (c=-11).
Everyone received these public good and “bad” rewards,
regardless of the decision to keep or give away the bonus of
11 points. Figure 2 does not include the bonus reward that is
added to the payoff of those subjects who decided to keep the
bonus. Moreover, to ensure positive payoffs, every subject
was entitled to an additional payment of 15 points at the end
of the experiment.




number of contributors in the green group 
0 1 2 3 4 5
num
ber of contributors in the green group
0
0 0 0 15 15 15
0 0 0 -15 -15 -15
1
0 0 0 15 15 15
0 0 0 -15 -15 -15
2
0 0 0 15 15 15
0 0 0 -15 -15 -15
3
-15 -15 -15 -11 15 15
15 15 15 -11 -15 -15
4
-15 -15 -15 -15 -11 15
15 15 15 15 -11 -15
5
-15 -15 -15 -15 -15 -11
15 15 15 15 15 -11
Note: The payoffs are public good rewards distributed to everyone
in the red (bottom left corner of each cell) and in the green (top
right corner) group. In addition to these payoffs, defectors could
keep the endowment of 11 points, and every subjects received 15
points to ensure  positive payments.
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In order to obtain more reliable
data in the experiments, the
game was played many times in
each session, but subjects re-
ceived payments in a randomly
selected single round only. No
information was provided during
the experiment about what has
happened in earlier rounds and
what others were doing in the
same round. In this way, every decision round could be
handled in an equivalent way. This method was applied in
earlier team game experiments by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef
(1994). 
Every experiment consisted of four parts (see Table 1). In
Part I, subjects made their decisions in isolation. In Part II,
subjects played the IPG game with minimal contact in differ-
ent network configurations that are represented in Figure 1.
The comparison of contribution rates in Parts I and II will
provide the opportunity to test the main hypotheses about
the presence of internalized social control mechanisms and
segregation effects. In Part III, monetary side-payments were
introduced between connected subjects. This intervention
aimed to provide a meaningful comparison of the relative
size of the effect of internalized social incentives and mone-
tary side-payments. With regard to monetary side-payments,
two conditions were implemented between experimental
sessions. Next to the payoffs that were present in the begin-
ning of the experiments (see Table 2), in Part III, in the
monetary behavioral confirmation condition external behav-
ioral confirmation incentives (5 points), in the monetary
selective incentives condition external in-group selective
incentives (5 points) were introduced (cf. Table 1). In Part
IV, in both conditions the other external incentives were
also introduced. Subjects received 5 points of behavioral
confirmation reward if one of their in-group neighbors chose
the same action as they did and received 10 points if two of
their in-group neighbors acted the same way. In-group selec-
tive incentives were distributed regardless of the decision of
neighbors. Contributors received 5 points for each in-group
neighbor they had. Out-group selective incentives were not
introduced in a monetary form. In the low segregation con-
dition (six sessions) there was no change due to the absence
of in-group neighbors and this condition was used as a con-
trol condition. To summarize, the experiment has followed
a 2×3 block-design that is represented in Table 2. 
The order of experimental parts shown in Table 1 was not
altered, since once identities are assigned to subjects there is
no logical way back to a no-identity treatment. The design is
therefore not perfectly counterbalanced, and results have to
be interpreted with the reservation that control for ordering
effects was not possible. 
Experiments were combined with repeated IPG games.
Repeated games followed single-shot games in all four exper-
imental parts. Experiments were designed so
as to exclude possible influences of previous
decisions. Subjects were explicitly told before
every part that previous parts and repeated
games are completely independent from the
next part. New parts always started after a
short break and with introductory instructions
that attempted to create the impression as if
nothing has happened before in the experiment. This manip-
ulation, however, cannot perfectly exclude the possibility of




203 subjects took part in the experiments at the University
of Groningen, in the Netherlands. Subjects were recruited
via e-mail and board advertisements promising monetary
rewards for participation. All 203 subjects completed the
decision tasks and only two have failed to complete the post-
decision questionnaire. Altogether, 21 sessions took place
and subjects made 4060 single-shot game decisions (20
each). The intended number of participants was ten in all
the 21 experimental sessions. On average, thirteen subjects
were invited to the sessions as it was anticipated that some
would not show up. Four sessions failed to be completely
filled. In these cases, computer players were included.3 Sub-
jects were told that they are programmed in a way to resem-
ble human behavior. In fact, they were simple programs
playing mixed strategies with condition-dependent probabili-
ties of contribution. Human decisions in the incomplete
experiments are also included in the analysis, but computer
decisions are excluded. The inclusion of simulated partici-
3 This meant 1, 2, 2, and 2 cases in these four sessions.
Table 1. Overview of Experimental Parts 
Part I anonymous control condition panel walls isolate subjects 
Part II minimal contact is established networks (low / medium / high segregation) 
Part III one form (b/s) of social control is introduced in
a monetary form 
networks (low / medium / high segregation) 
Part IV the other form (s/b) of social control is
introduced in a monetary form 
networks (low / medium / high segregation) 
Table 2. The Number of Sessions by Experimental Conditions 
level of segregation  low medium high 
  monetary behavioral confirmation is introduced in Part III 3 4 3 
  monetary in-group selective incentives introduced in Part III 3 4 3 
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pants did not have a significant influence on the behavior of
subjects in the IPG games.4 
114 (56.2%) subjects were female. 187 (92.1%) subjects
were university students at the time of the experiments and
16 had already graduated. Students came from all faculties of
the university: 55 studied behavioral or social sciences, 47
subscribed for literary studies or art, 26 studied natural
sciences, 17 studied law, 13 studied economics, 10 were
students at the business faculty, there were 8 students of
medical science, 8 subjects studied spatial sciences, and one
subject read philosophy. Because of similarities and for the
sake of simplicity, economic, business, and spatial sciences
were merged in the analysis (furthermore, these faculties
have the same physical location) and the student of philoso-
phy was allocated to the category of literary studies and art.
The college major of two subjects was unknown. 
Single-shot games (only the decision rounds) took approxi-
mately three minutes in each experimental part. During this
time subjects had to make five decisions. The entire experi-
ment was on average 80 minutes long. 
The payoff for subjects was contingent on their decisions, as
well as on the decisions of other participants of the session.
Individual payoffs were calculated on the basis of outcomes
in the single-shot and in the repeated games. From the
single-shot games, only one was selected randomly in each
experimental part to be included in the calculation. This
payoff had a weight of five rounds (the number of single-shot
games in one experimental part). Total payoffs varied be-
tween 14 and 32 points with an average of 21.1 points that
was equivalent to 8.9 USD. If subjects ran out of decision
time, a random decision was implemented with 50% chance
of contribution. For all such cases, final payment was de-
creased by 1%. This happened only 26 times out of 4060
decisions (0.64%). Random decisions are not included in the
analysis. 
Procedure 
Experiments were conducted in the same computer labora-
tory. Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated at a com-
puter.5 Panel walls separated the subjects to ensure their
privacy. Subjects received instructions on paper and on their
screen.6 After reading the instructions they were allowed to
ask the experimenter questions. After the questions had
been answered, subjects were not allowed to talk. All partici-
pants strictly adhered to the rules. After the questions, an
examination of understanding followed. 
In each of the four experimental parts, subjects played five
rounds of single-shot IPG games, and a randomly chosen
number of repeated games afterwards. In every decision
round, subjects had to decide whether they would keep the
11 points bonus or give it to help their group to achieve
success in the competition. These two options appeared in a
randomized order on their screen. The bonus was repre-
sented also graphically as a bag of money. Subjects were
assured of the anonymity of their decisions and that they
would receive the amount of money they earned during the
experiment in sealed envelopes, after the experiments had
ended. In the single-shot games, it was announced that every
decision counts towards the final payment, but that only one
game of each part would be chosen randomly for payment. 
In the beginning of Part II, panel walls were removed and
group membership was made public by the experimenter.
Red and green flags were attached to the monitors and
subjects also received an A-4 colored paper with the color of
their group. In each condition, subjects were arranged be-
hind computers due to the neighborhood configuration of
the given session. Participants could clearly see the indica-
tion signs of group membership of their neighbors, and with
some effort they could also check membership of more
distant subjects. Subjects played five rounds of the same IPG
game again. Before every decision in Part II, III, and IV,
subjects had to give their expectations about the subsequent
decision of their neighbors. The five single-shot games were
followed by repeated games in each part.7
Calculation and announcement of the individual results
followed the experiment. Meanwhile subjects were asked to
fill in a questionnaire on their computer. Monetary payments
were supplied in sealed envelopes. The first subject, who had
completed the questionnaire, could go immediately to the
experimenter to receive payment. Other subjects had to wait
until they got a signal from the server. Hence, subjects left
the laboratory individually, with a short time difference
between their departures. 
ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTION PROPENSITIES 
This section describes the logic of analysis that is used to test
the main hypotheses. Besides the main effects of social
control that are believed to be the underlying mechanisms of
the segregation effect on intergroup conflict, the influence of
personal characteristics are discussed that are handled as
control variables. 
For the analysis of experimental data multilevel logistic re-
gression is used (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein,
1995). There are two levels in this case. Single decisions are
the lower level observations and subjects, who took these
4 A group-level control variable indicating the presence of a computer
player was not significant when added to any of the multivariate models
discussed in the Results section.
5 The computer program for the experiment was written by Sicco
Strampel in Delphi.
6 Full instructions are available in Takács (2002: 101-104).
7 In the repeated games, subjects were informed about the result of the
previous round.
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decisions, and their characteristics are the higher level ob-
servations. The two-level model corrects for the method-
ological problem that observations within the subjects are
not independent. Multilevel models take care of this de-
pendency and separates within subject and between subject
variance. For the binary dependent variable of individual
contribution, the logit transformation is used. Formally, let
the function Pri denote the propensity of actor i to cooperate
in the rth single-shot game. Note that while the probability
of contribution is between 0 and 1, the propensity can take
any value. The propensity of cooperation is specified by the
logit link function (Goldstein 1995: Chapter 7), which is the
natural logarithm of the quotient of the probability of contri-














⎟⎟ = + +ln α ε ξ0
where α0 is the baseline contribution propensity. Notation εi
stands for a subject level error term and ξri is intra-individual
variation. The latter term represents the residual variance
that is not estimated in models that include the random
intercept α0. It is assumed that the subject level error has a
zero expected value and has a normal distribution, formally( )ε σi N~ ,0 2
where the variance σ2 is going to be estimated. This baseline
model does not contain any explanatory variables and allows
to model behavior in the anonymous control condition (Part
I). 
Intra-individual variation results from experimental manipu-
lations. These main factors are relevant after the introduc-
tion of minimal contact in Part II. Additional reasons for
intra-individual variation that can already be present in the
control condition are stochastic individual decisions, consid-
eration of mixed strategies, or simply inconsistency. Since
nothing distinguishes between single-shot game rounds, only
a low intra-individual variation is expected within an experi-
mental part that might be due to individual uncertainty or
inconsistency. In the simplest model, it is assumed that
intra-individual variation is not correlated with round num-
ber r and has a zero expected value. However, this assump-
tion will be relaxed and a trend element will be added, if
there are indications of learning the structure of the game
through the experiment. 
Main effects: social control 
With the introduction of minimal contact and network
structures (Part II), the effect of segregation on intergroup
relations and the presence of underlying internalized mech-
anisms can be tested. The number of in-group ties is pre-
dicted to have a positive effect on contribution rates as
minimal contact allows for the activation of internalized in-
group selective incentives rewarding contribution and pun-
ishing defection (s0). The number of out-group ties is pre-
dicted to provide an incentive against contribution because
of internalized out-group selective incentives (t0). An auxil-
iary assumption here is that internalized selective incentives
affect contribution propensities as a linear function of the
number of ties. This number varies between subjects; it is
zero in Part I for all subjects and might be 0, 1, or 2 in later
parts of the experiment depending on the network condi-
tion. 
The expected behavior of in-group alters is relevant for
internalized behavioral confirmation as subjects are pre-
dicted to adjust their actual decisions to the expected deci-
sion of alters from their group. The difference between the
expected number of contributing in-group alters and the
expected number of defecting in-group alters is predicted to
have a positive effect on contribution rates (captured by the
parameter b0). As it was expressed earlier, if the expected
number of contributors is higher, behavioral confirmation
increases the likelihood of contribution. On the other hand,
in case there are more defectors among alters, behavioral
confirmation decreases the likelihood of contribution. Be-
cause of the simple network patterns used in the experiment,
the difference can only take integer values between -2 and 2.
The parameter values of s0, t0, b0 are estimated from the
experimental results. The relative weight of the utility of
monetary rewards and of the utilities attached to different
forms of non-monetary incentives can change from person to
person. Therefore, no specific form of utility function is
assumed that could be applied to everyone. In the simplest
model, only the average individual importance of internal-
ized social control is estimated, but some presented models
will allow for a random variance in the size of these effects.
Models with random effects will assume that the effects of
internalized social control for the subjects are normally dis-
tributed around their means. This is consistent with the
statement that individuals do not assign the same relative
utility for social control, but the utilities are scattered nor-
mally around a certain mean evaluation. In this part of the
analysis, variances of the effects of different forms of inter-
nalized social control will be estimated, as well as their
covariances. 
For a better calibration of social control effects, in some
sessions from Part III on, external social control is intro-
duced in the form of monetary side-payments. External
selective incentives (s) and behavioral confirmation (b) are
predicted to have a positive effect on contribution rates and
these parameters are also need to be estimated. Effects of
external social control can clearly be separated from inter-
nalized social control, as in Part II of the experiments only
internalized social control could have an effect. The size of
the effect of external control, however, might interact with
the size of the effect of internalized social control. In general,
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the utility of monetary rewards might differ subject by sub-
ject, therefore, part of the multilevel analysis will allow for a
random variation in their sizes over the subjects. 
Control variables and interaction effects 
Previous experiments revealed several important factors that
influence cooperation rates in social dilemmas (e.g.,
Ledyard, 1995). The inter-individual variation of contribu-
tion propensities in intergroup related collective action
might also depend on personal characteristics, like gender,
college major, experience in similar experiments, attitudes
towards risk, or social orientations. These factors will be
included in the analysis as control variables; therefore no
hypotheses are explicated about their effects. They are
included as controls because they enrich research with
interesting insight and comparisons can be made with previ-
ous findings. 
For instance, there are contradictory findings in previous
social dilemma experiments about whether women or men
are more cooperative (e.g., Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985;
Stockard, van de Kragt, and Dodge, 1988; Mason, Phillips,
and Redington, 1991; Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993;
Brown-Kruse and Hummels, 1993; Nowell and Tinkler,
1994; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Eckel and Grossman,
1998; Ortmann and Tichy, 1999). Most subjects participat-
ing in experiments are students at different faculties of the
university. Direction of study might cause individual differ-
ences in willingness of contribution. Previous research found
that economists have lower contribution rates (Marwell and
Ames, 1981; Carter and Irons, 1991; Frank, Gilovich, and
Regan, 1993), although there are also experiments that do
not find this effect(Isaac, McCue, and Plott,1985;for an
overview, see Ledyard,1995:161, 179). 
Besides these background variables, relevant factors include
attitude measures that indicate special forms of individual
utility functions. Previous findings show that attitudes to-
wards risk correlate with contribution propensities
(Suleiman and Or-Chen, 1999). Since the contribution
decision involves the possibility of a higher reward, but also
involves the risk of losing the bonus completely, subjects
with a risk-seeking attitude might have higher contribution
rates (Budescu, Rapoport, and Suleiman, 1990). On the
other hand, there are arguments that in repeated social
dilemmas risk aversion increases cooperation (Raub and
Snijders, 1997; van Assen and Snijders, 2002). In the experi-
ments of this study, attitudes towards risk were included only
as control variables. For the measurement of risk prefer-
ences, questions with preference comparisons (see Farquhar,
1984) were used. 
Utility functions can also include altruistic elements, which
certainly influence rational decision-making in social di-
lemma experiments (e.g., Liebrand, 1984; Doi, 1994). Sub-
jects, who order positive utilities for the gains of others,
behave differently from individualistic ones. For the approxi-
mation of such utilities, standard questions regarding social
orientations were used. They consisted of a series of decom-
posed games with an unknown person.8 The measurement
presumed that individuals are only prosocial (cooperative),
individualistic, or competitive. Previous research found only
these types relevant in describing human behavior (van
Lange et al., 1997; van Lange, 1999; Suleiman and Or-
Chen, 1999). Among each type an egalitarian tendency was
distinguished (cf. van Lange, 1999). Although in a two-
person PD game or in a public good experiment higher
contribution rates are expected from prosocial subjects, it is
not at all evident in the IPG game. One could argue that
subjects who order utility weights for rewards of unknown
others, would do this equally for everyone, including out-
group members. Consequently, their contribution rates
would not be different from individualistic subjects. A
counter-argument is that prosocial (and also egalitarian)
orientation is associated with high utility for social identity,
which is obtainable in a relational comparison with the out-
group. Hence prosocial orientation is primarily directed
towards in-group members. Results will show whether pro-
social individuals are more concerned about harmful out-
comes and thus abstain from contribution or whether they
have higher contribution propensities and are even the
initiators of harmful intergroup conflict. 
Some of the participants knew each other. As acquaintances
might influence actual decisions in the experiment, the
number of acquaintances in the experiment is included as a
control variable. In part of the analysis, interaction effects of
background variables and social control are also included,
because the relative size of internalized social control in the
utility function might depend on certain personal character-
istics. There are contradictory findings in previous experi-
ments about whether people are more likely to think of
others of the same sex to be contributors and in general,
whether men or women are more likely to be thought of as
better contributors (Ortmann and Tichy, 1999; Solnick and
Schweitzer, 1999). For explorative reasons, interactions
between gender and social control and interactions between
social orientations and social control are also included as
control variables. 
Since experiments were designed to separate motives in
single-shot situations from incentives that are present in re-
peated play, no history effects are expected on single-shot
decisions, but as a test of this hypothesis, previous outcomes
of iterated games were included as control variables in part
of the analysis. 
8 The exact questions can be found in Takács (2002). 
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RESULTS 
Contribution rates and conflict under different
experimental conditions 
As the consequence of dyadic social control, different out-
comes were expected by segregation conditions. The segre-
gation hypothesis predicted that conflict is least likely in the
mixed condition and is most likely in the highly segregated
setting. Table 3 summarizes the experimental outcomes by
segregation conditions. The hypothesis that the outcomes of
the IPG game are independent of segregation conditions can
be rejected (χ2(3)=46.370, p<0.001). 
Table 3 shows that conflict was
already quite likely in the con-
trol condition. It indicates that
many subjects have contributed
even when they were isolated,
which cannot be explained by
social control effects. Conflict
was much less likely in the low
segregation condition, and oc-
curred most often in the high
segregation condition, which
supports the segregation hypo-
thesis. On the other hand, con-
flict was almost as likely in the
medium segregation condition
as in high segregation. Conflict
occurred in 85.83% of the cases
in the medium and 88.57% of




Contribution rates by segrega-
tion conditions are summarized
in Table 4. The differences be-
tween segregation conditions are
the result of internalized and external social control. In order
to test whether internalized social control can alone cause
such differences between segregation conditions, results from
Parts I and II are compared. The comparison reveals that
minimal contact made an increase in contribution rates. The
difference is significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1%
level (t=1.722, one-tailed p=0.043). In Part II, the contri-
bution rate was highest in the medium segregation condition,
which contradicts the segregation hypothesis. Table 4 also shows
average contribution rates in Parts III and IV of the experi-
ment.  The hypothesis that contribution rates are the same in
the different conditions can be rejected both in Part III
Table 3. Outcomes by Segregation Conditions in the Experiments
outcome of the decision round 
segregation condition in the experiment no competitive action conflict Total
control condition (unknown group membership) 26.97%  (271) 73.03%  (734) 100%  (1005) 
low segregation 50.23%  (428) 49.77%  (424) 100%  (852) 
medium segregation 13.75% ( 160) 86.25%  (1004) 100%  (1164) 
high segregation 11.85%  (120) 88.15%  (893) 100%  (1013) 
Total N 24.27%  (979) 75.73%  (3055) 100%  (4034) 
Note. Cases in parentheses are weighted (multiplied) by the number of human decisions in the given game. For the χ2
test unweighted outcomes are used, N = 420
Table 4. Average Contribution Rates in Different Segregation Conditions and Parts of the
Experiment
incentives segregation level Total
introduced first low medium high 
Part I* 49.64% (280) 51.81% (386) 46.61% (339) 49.45% (1005)
 Part II 50.35% (282) 55.84% (385) 52.84% (335) 53.29% (1002)
 Part III 
     b (confirmation) - 58.42% (190) 47.33% (150) 53.53% (340) 
     s (sel. incentives) - 63.82% (199) 75.66% (189) 69.59% (388) 
     Part III total 40.35% (285) 61.18% (389) 63.13% (339) 55.97% (1013)
 Part IV 
     b (confirmation) - 62.63% (190) 68.00% (150) 65.00% (340) 
     s (sel. incentives) - 71.00% (200) 81.48% (189) 76.09% (389) 
     Part IV total 25.96% (285) 66.92% (390) 75.52% (339) 58.28% (1014) 
Total (without Part I) 38.85% (852) 61.34% (1164) 63.87% (1013) 55.86% (3029) 
Total 41.52% (1132) 58.97% (1550) 59.54% (1352) 54.26% (4034) 
Notes. The number of cell-relevant cases is in parentheses. All human decisions are included. 
* In Part I, subjects did not know their group membership and they did not see each other. Therefore their
partition into the different segregation conditions only illustrates coincidental baseline contribution rates in the
different experimental sessions. 
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(ANOVA F (2, 1010)=30.800, p<0.001) and in Part IV
(ANOVA F (2, 1011)=108.721, p<0.001). It was predicted
that the introduction of monetary selective incentives would
result in higher contribution rates than when behavioral
confirmation is introduced in Part III. Results confirm this
hypothesis (t=4.487, one-tailed p<0.001). Furthermore, ear-
lier introduction of monetary in-group selective incentives
made a difference also in Part IV (t=3.285, two-tailed
p=0.001). This result indicates that history effects still play a
role in determining individual decision, despite the lack of
 feedback regarding the results of single-shot games. Further-
more, figures in Table 4 also support the hypothesis that in the
presence of monetary in-group selective incentives, the effect of
segregation is stronger than in the presence of monetary behavioral
confirmation. In Part III, in the monetary in-group selective
incentives condition average contribution rates are higher in
the high segregation condition (75.66%) than in medium
segregation (63.82%). On the other hand, in the monetary
behavioral confirmation condition average contribution rates
are higher in the medium segregation condition (58.42% vs.
47.33%). 
Table 5. Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression on Contribution Propensities 








of social control effects
FIXED EFFECTS
" baseline contribution propensity ?  -.038    (.082)  -.037    (.082)
s0 internalized selective incentives +   .109    (.072)   .117    (.072)
s external selective incentives +   .407*** (.088)   .363*** (.104)
b0 internalized behavioral confirmation +   .617
*** (.065)   .640*** (.077)
b  external behavioral confirmation +   .619*** (.104)   .615*** (.118)
t0 internalized traitor rewards -  -.175
**  (.055)  -.173**  (.057)
RANDOM EFFECTS
inter-individual variance σ2   .616+++ (.085)  .628+++ (.121)
σ2ui (s0)  .000       (.000)
σ2ui (s) .300+ +   (.139)
σ2ui (b0) .196+++ (.093)
σ2ui (b) .326+++ (.226)
σ2ui (t0) .009 (.050)
Covariances are reported below
-2 Log Likelihood model 4480 4430
Improvement χ2 (df in parentheses) 939*** (5)# 50*** (20)
Table 5b. Random Effects: Estimated Covariances
σuxy εi s0 s b0 b
s0   .000    (.000)
s -.252     (.108)  .000 (.000)
b0   .147    (.083)  .000 (.000) -.194 (.085)
b -.359++ (.131)  .000 (.000)  .128 (.132)  -.079 (.116)
t0 -.005     (.072)  .000 (.000)  .425 (.153)  -.169 (.109)   .176 (.165)
Notes. N=4011 decisions for 203 subjects. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. **
significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed). 
For testing random effects deviance tests are used: ++ significant at the 1% level, +++ significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in
deviance compared to model without random slopes, for random covariates deviance is compared to model without random covariates).
#Basis of comparison: baseline multilevel logistic regression expressed in equation (2); α: 0.174** (0.066); σ2: 0.674+++ (0.087).
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Analysis of contribution propensities: a simple
model 
To understand the underlying mechanisms of the segregation
effect on intergroup conflict, individual decisions have to be
analyzed. The first model in Table 5 reports results for the
two-level model on contribution propensities without control
variables.9 The second model assumes that estimates of social
control over subjects are normally distributed around their
mean. In this model the variances and covariances are esti-
mated as random effects. All human decisions except 23 cases
(0.006%) are included. In these 23 cases subjects did not
present any expectations about the behavior of their neigh-
bors. In total, 4011 decisions are included in the analysis for
203 subjects. 
The two models provide similar estimates. All effects are in
the predicted direction. Hypotheses about the existence of
internalized behavioral confirmation and internalized out-
group selective incentives are supported. This means that
contribution rates have increased with the difference between
the number of expected in-group contributors and defectors
and they have decreased with the number of out-group con-
tacts. The effect of internalized in-group selective incentives
is not significant. According to this result, the number of in-
group contacts does not enforce contributions, if one controls
for internalized behavioral confirmation. As predicted, both
forms of external social control have a significant effect. It is
important to note, however, that this simple model did not
include any control variables. 
Contribution rates between subjects have a high unexplained
variance.10 The influence of behavioral confirmation and
monetary in-group selective incentives varies significantly
between subjects. The hypothesis that the sizes of internalized
selective incentives are the same for the subjects cannot be
rejected. High positive deviations from the average baseline
contribution rate are correlated with negative deviations from
the average importance of monetary rewards for confirmation.
This is not surprising because subjects, who evaluate monetary
gains less, contribute more to the success of their group. 
The effect of personal characteristics and other
control variables 
To see which personal characteristics are responsible for high
inter-individual variation, the model is extended by back-
ground variables and certain attitude measures. Furthermore,
in the previous analysis it was assumed that intra-individual
variation ( >ir) has a zero expected value and it is independent
from the decision round r. If contribution propensities are not
stable in the single-shot games within experimental parts, then
an independent trend element has to be included in the analy-
sis and the assumption that intra-individual variation ( >ir) has
a zero expected value has to be relaxed. As parts were sepa-
rated by breaks, instead of checking for a single learning trend,
it is better to distinguish between a within part and a between
part learning trend in the analysis. 
Two analyses are conducted again: one assuming fixed social
control effects without random variation and another assum-
ing a random variation and covariation of these estimates (see
Table 6).  As the analysis controls for some disturbing proce-
dural effects, results show the net effect of main variables. 
There are remarkable changes in the parameter estimates of
social control. The effect of internalized in-group selective
incentives became significant and the significant effect of
internalized out-group selective incentives has disappeared.
The large increase in the estimate of baseline contribution
propensity (constant) also indicates that the omission of
independent trends resulted in a systematic bias in previous
estimates in Table 5.  Because of the negative between parts
tendency, the baseline contribution rate was underestimated
and the decrease between Part I and Part II was attributed to
the effect of internalized out-group selective incentives. On
the basis of the analysis reported in Table 6, after controlling
for a negative learning tendency, it turns out that on average,
out-group selective incentives in an internalized form do not
influence the decision of subjects. On the other hand, this
interpretation and also the confirmation of the existence of
internalized in-group selective incentives has to be handled
with reservations. The inclusion of a between parts trend in a
linear functional form in the analysis does not stand on a firm
theoretical basis. Furthermore, since the high correlation with
experimental manipulations (the introduction of minimal
contact and monetary forms of social control), the learning
effect might include part of influence that should be attributed
to other variables. 
There is another complication in relation to the difference in
contribution propensities between Parts I and II. Silent identi-
fication (Bohnet and Frey, 1999) enters social dilemma experi-
ments, when subjects are able to see each other. The visibility
of others decreases social distance, allows for empathy and
helps to conceptualize the experimental situation. However,
this effect cannot be separated from the influence of internal-
ized selective incentives that are not contingent on predic-
tions. If silent identification is a valid mechanism in the IPG
game, the analysis overestimates the effect of internalized
selective incentives. The unexpected positive sign of the t0
estimate can also partly be explained by silent identification.
Among personal background variables, gender has no signifi-
cant effect, although simple descriptive statistics showed that
women had higher contribution rates (55.94%) than men
(52.14%). Based also on descriptive statistics, subjects who
already graduated were more contributive (61.54%) than
students (53.58%). This effect is not significant in the model,
as it is ruled out by other variables, mainly by social orientat-
9 For goodness-of-fit, -2 log likelihood statistics and P2 tests of improve-
ment are indicated at the bottom of tables. 
10 For testing hypotheses about random effects it is more appropriate to
use deviance tests than the t-test (cf. van Duijn, van Busschbach, and
Snijders, 1999: 192-193). 
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Table 6a. Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression on Contribution Propensities with Personal Characteristics and
Procedure Effects 
independent variable hypothesis about the
direction of effect 
multilevel model with fixed
slopes of main effects 
multilevel model random
slopes of main effects 
FIXED EFFECTS 
" (constant) baseline contr. propensity ? 1.378** (.423) 1.516*** (.409) 
s0 internalized in-group selective incentives + .186
* (.082) .188* (.081) 
t0 internalized out-group selective incentives - .165 (.086) .142 (.086) 
b0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .586
*** (.067) .591*** (.080) 
s monetary in-group selective incentives + .769*** (.109) .699***  (.127) 
b monetary behavioral confirmation + .718*** (.108) .705***  (.126) 
Personal characteristics and other subject-level variables 
gender (1=male) -.176 (.143) -.196 (.137) 
student at the university (1=yes) -.219 (.370) -.352 (.357) 
studies at the law faculty -.109 (.366) -.015 (.351) 
studies natural sciences -.057 (.344) -.065 (.330) 
studies economic, business, or spatial sci. -.030 (.335) .095 (.322) 
studies social sciences .068 (.309) .136 (.296) 
student of literary studies or arts .056 (.316) .133 (.303) 
did a similar experiment before -.154 (.136) -.188 (.131) 
strong risk aversion towards gains -.163 (.135) -.180 (.129) 
strong loss aversion .115 (.134) .132 (.128) 
consistent answers on social orientation qs -.374* (.181) -.400* (.173) 
prosocial orientation .511** (.183) .487** (.175) 
egalitarian orientation .388* (.176) .392* (.169) 
number of acquainted subjects in the exp. -.079 (.088) -.093 (.085) 
delay (minutes) at the start of the exp. .008 (.007) .006 (.007) 
quiz questions answered correctly % -.005 (.004) -.005 (.004) 
Procedure effects 
within part trend -.215*** (.036) -.213*** (.036) 
endgame effect .373** (.125) .370** (.126) 
between parts trend -.397*** (.060) -.379*** (.061) 
last iterated game was a draw .538*** (.149) .515*** (.152)
last iterated game was lost .185 (.122) .199 (.125) 
last iterated game was won .214 (.123) .275* (.125) 
RANDOM EFFECTS 
inter-individual variance F2 .574+++  (.083) .559+++ (.116) 
F
2 ui (s0) .000 (.000) 
F
2 ui (t0) .002 (.050) 
F
2 ui (b0) .202
+++ (.096) 
F
2 ui (s) .322+++ (.152) 
F
2 ui (b) .421+++ (.246) 
Covariances are reported below + 
-2 Log Likelihood model 4480 4430 
Improvement P2 (df in parentheses) 939***(5)# 50***(20) 
Table 6b. Random Effects: Estimated Covariances 
σuxy εi s0 t0 b0 s
s0 .000   (.000)
t0 -.018   (.071) .000  (.000)
b0 .037   (.083) .000  (.000) -.054  (.117)
s -.163   (.109) .000  (.000) .476  (.169) -.192+ (.090)
b -.287+ (.133) .000  (.000) .152  (.180) -.084   (.123) .063 (.143)
Notes.  N=4011 decisions for 203 subjects. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed). 
For testing random effects deviance tests are used: + significant at the 5% level, +++ significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance
compared to model without random slopes, for random covariates deviance is compared to model without random covariates)
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tions. The analysis of college major does not reveal an effect of
economics training. The argument that experience matters at
all is questioned by the insignificant effect of participating in a
similar experiment before. Again, the difference in descriptive
statistics (56.14% vs. 51.44%) could be explained by selection
on attitude measures. 
Subjects were characterized as strongly risk-averse, if they
chose for risk-averse alternatives both in simple and complex
gambles. 91 subjects (45.3%) were strongly risk-averse towards
gains, 92 (45.8%) were strongly risk-averse towards mixed
gambles, and 83 (39.5%) were strongly risk-seeking towards
losses. Effects of risk-aversion and loss-aversion, however, are
not significant in the models. 
The only personal characteristics that are found significant in
explaining contribution propensities are social orientations. For
questions about social orientations, 77 (37.9%) subjects gave
inconsistent answers. Inconsistency was a significant predictor
of contribution rates, which is probably related to the relevance
of calculation abilities. Among subjects, who gave consistent
answers, 76 (61.3%) were prosocial, which is higher than in
previous experiments (for an overview see Schulz and May,
1989). As an exception, Liebrand (1984) found a similar high
rate in his experiments conducted in Groningen. Results clearly
support the argument that prosocial (and also egalitarian)
orientation is primarily directed towards in-group members and
therefore increases contribution rates in the IPG game. The
strong effects also indicate that social orientations are
important predictors of behavior in intergroup situations.
Individuals with prosocial and egalitarian attitudes seem to be
responsible for the emergence of mutually harmful outcomes.
There was no significant effect of delay time at the start of the
experiment and of how many others were acquainted to
subjects in the laboratory. These factors that are related to the
experimental environment did not disturb the behavior of
subjects. 
Although Bayesian learning effects cannot enter the series of
single-shot games, as experimental time passes, subjects might
understand the structure of the game better and can become
more experienced with the decision task. Previous experiments
of iterated PD, public good, and IPG games found that subjects
approach the all-defection equilibrium over time (Isaac,
McCue, and Plott, 1985; Andreoni, 1988; Andreoni and
Miller, 1993; Bornstein, Winter, and Goren, 1996; Goren and
Bornstein, 2000; Goren, 2001), which results in decreasing
cooperation rates. In this study, a decay of contribution is
found for the series of single-shot games. Contribution rates
decreased for those, who had some misunderstanding of the
task before the game, but also for those, who answered quiz
questions correctly. Besides the decreasing within part trend,
in the last round of every part contribution rates increased
significantly. This is a surprising result, since subjects knew that
the outcome of the last round would not be announced. This
is exactly the opposite of what would be predicted on the basis
of arguments of traditional game theory even if subjects had the
incorrect perception that they are playing repeated games. By
analyzing last rounds only, model parameters were similar to
those values that were reported in Table 6, including an
insignificant effect of internalized in-group selective incentives.
It means that higher contribution propensities in the last
rounds cannot be explained by the reduction of cognitive
dissonance (“in the last round I have to be nice, otherwise I
cannot look at my fellow neighbors”). The resulting U-shape
trend, however, has some correspondence to experimental
findings in the iterated two-person PD and in collective action
games (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Guttman, 1986). 
Besides a within part trend, a between parts trend is also
included in the models in Table 6 as a control variable. Both
trends are highly significant, as well as the puzzling endgame
effect. Trends and endgame effects are not the only unexpected
procedure effects. After controlling for the results of repeated
games, it emerged that a mutually harmful draw (punishment)
“burns in” the memory of subjects and increases contribution
propensities also in the single-shot games. Unfortunately, this
points to a weakness of the present design. This also indicates
that subjects use their long-term memory to estimate whether
or not their decision could make a difference for the outcome
in the forthcoming single-shot game. If they believe that a draw
will occur, a single individual contribution can turn the
outcome to winning the public good. 
Interaction effects 
As Table 6 demonstrated, the significant effect of internalized
out-group selective incentives disappeared after the inclusion
of learning trends. It might be possible that this form of social
control is mistakenly conceptualized and out-group selective
incentives have a different nature. They might stem from the
presence of the other group as a whole or they exist only in
certain dyadic relations. 
The extension of the model by interaction effects helps with
some clarification (see Table 7). It seems that internalized out-
group selective incentives are activated in the dyadic context,
but not in every neighborhood relation. Only neighbors of the
opposite sex provide a significant control in the form of out-
group selective incentives. This indicates that internalized
pressure against contribution in the presence of opposite group
members is activated only, when a substantive distinction can be
made apart from minimal group membership. Gender is possibly
the most apparent characteristic that can be the source of this
distinction between strangers. With respect to the interaction
between gender and internalized behavioral confirmation, no
significant effect is found on contribution propensities. 
However, descriptive statistics showed that subjects expected
contribution more from in-group neighbors of the same sex and
additionally, women were expected to contribute more. 
Acquainted neighbors did not experience stronger social
control than unknown ones did. Similar to the insignificant
effect of the number of acquainted subjects in the experiment,
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Table 7a. Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression on Contribution Propensities with Personal Characteristics, Procedure
Effects, and Cross-level Interactions
independent variable hypothesis about the
direction of effect 






" (constant) baseline contr. propensity ? 1.346*** (.402) 1.491** (.477)
s0 internalized in-group selective incentives + .176* (.082) .165* (.084)
t0 internalized out-group selective incentives - .223 (.132) .238 (.134)
b0 internalized behavioral confirmation + .589*** (.119) .618*** (.141)
s monetary in-group selective incentives + .769*** (.110) .745*** (.135)
b monetary behavioral confirmation + .703*** (.109) .681*** (.125)
Personal characteristics and other subject-level variables 
gender (1=male) -.089 (.146) -.135 (.143)
student at the university (1=yes) -.177 (.372) -.201 (.364)
studies at the law faculty -.162 (.368) -.136 (.360)
studies natural sciences -.101 (.349) -.161 (.341)
studies economic, business, or spatial sci. -.080 (.339) -.002 (.330)
studies social sciences -.001 (.312) .000 (.305)
student of literary studies or arts .045 (.317) .066 (.309)
did a similar experiment before -.179 (.136) -.221 (.133)
strong risk aversion towards gains -.172 (.134) -.157 (.132)
strong loss aversion .131 (.133) .164 (.131)
consistent answers on social orientation qs -.397* (.180) -.404* (.176)
prosocial orientation .330 (.206) .353 (.202)
egalitarian orientation .419* (.203) .394* (.200)
number of acquainted subjects in the exp. -.066 (.089) -.066 (.087)
delay (minutes) at the start of the exp. .006 (.007) .006 (.007)
quiz questions answered correctly % -.004 (.005) -.005 (.005)
Procedure effects 
within part trend -.178 (.121) -.188 (.122)
endgame effect .379** (.126) .381** (.127)
between parts trend -.397*** (.061) -.386*** (.062)
last iterated game was a draw .527*** (.150) .495** (.157)
last iterated game was lost .180 (.123) .186 (.128)
last iterated game was won .214 (.124) .266* (.128)
Cross-level interactions
t0 × number of acquainted opposite neighbors -.153 (.196) -.164 (.194)
b0 × number of acquainted in-group neighbors .302 (.261) .338 (.312)
t0 × number of opposite neighbors of the other sex -.351** (.134) -.373** (.137)
t0 × number of male opposite neighbors .191 (.134) .156 (.136)
b0 × number of in-group neighbors of the same sex -.038 (.084) -.128 (.102)
b0 × number of female in-group neighbors .302 (.261) .017 (.108)
t0 × prosocial orientation .275* (.131) .256* (.132)
b0 × prosocial orientation .052 (.134) .098 (.161)
t0 × egalitarian orientation -.057 (.149) -.025 (.149)
b0 × egalitarian orientation .039 (.143) .004 (.172)
within part trend ´ quiz questions correct % .000 (.001) .000 (.001)
RANDOM EFFECTS 
inter-individual variance F2 .563+++ (.082) .512+++ (.084)
F
2 ui (s0) .000 (.000)
F
2 ui (t0) .000 (.000)
F
2 ui (b0) .143
+++ (.089)
F
2 ui (s) .549+++ (.187)
F
2 ui (b) .379+++ (.240)
Covariances are reported below +
-2 Log Likelihood model 4211 4169
Improvement P2 (df in parentheses) 42**  (20)
vs. previous model 36*** (11) 29**  (11)
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Table 7b. Random Effects: Estimated Covariances 
σuxy εi s0 t0 b0 s
s0 .000   ( .000)
t0 .000    (.000) .000  (.000)
b0 .004    (.072) .000  (.000) .000  (.000)
s .037    (.107) .000  (.000) .000  (.000) -.145 (.093)
b -.200++ (.118) .000  (.000) .000  (.000) -.031 (.116) .201 (.152)
Notes.  N=4011 decisions for 203 subjects. Iterative Generalized Least Squares estimates. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level, *** significant at the 0.1% level (two-tailed). 
For testing random effects deviance tests are used: + significant at the 5% level, +++ significant at the 0.1% level (significance of difference in deviance
compared to model without random slopes, for random covariates deviance is compared to model without random covariates)
this result can probably be attributed to the fact that they were
not close acquaintances or simply, subjects considered labor-
atory conditions impersonal. Prosocial and egalitarian attitudes
were not correlated with higher relative weight of internalized
social control. Only the interaction between out-group
selective incentives and prosocial orientation proved to be
significant. This effect indicates that prosocial subjects liked to
be “local heroes”, who contributed even when they were
surrounded by members of the other group. This is another in-
dication of how prosocial attitudes can be harmful in the
intergroup context. 
DISCUSSION 
The main objective of this study was to show how social con-
trol mechanisms enter into simple experimental situations and
can affect individual decisions in social dilemmas. As an aggre-
gated result of different forms of social control, it was demon-
strated how network segregation might induce the emergence of
conflict between groups. To discover the underlying mechanisms,
the study investigated what is the exact nature of social control
and what are the forms that are already present in a condition
with only minimal contact between subjects. For the test of
hypotheses, a unique experimental design was introduced
based on special arrangements in the laboratory. With this
setup, network based social control, which is believed to be
influential also in real life, was the target of analysis in an
experimental environment. 
In the experiments, intergroup competitions were modeled by
an Intergroup Public Goods game (Rapoport and Bornstein,
1987; Takács, 2001). Comparison of segregation conditions
showed that intergroup conflict was least likely in a completely
mixed setting and was most likely when members of the groups
were arranged according to a segregated pattern, which con-
firms the segregation hypothesis. Furthermore, as predicted,
the segregation effect was stronger in the presence of monetary
in-group selective incentives than in the presence of monetary
behavioral confirmation. 
By analyzing individual decisions, social control mechanisms
were uncovered that cause the segregation effect on the aggre-
gated level. Behavioral confirmation is found to be the form of
social control, which strongly affects individual contribution
propensities, also in an internalized form. Subjects adjusted
their decisions towards the expected decision of their in-group
contacts even when only a minimal contact and “minimum
network relations” have been established between them.
Estimates of model parameters indicate that under the chosen
reward structure, internalized behavioral confirmation affected
contribution propensities as much as monetary behavioral
confirmation. Concerning behavioral confirmation, however,
a part of the significant effect might be due to the bi-direc-
tional relationship between own behavior and expectations
about the behavior of others. Subjects formulated their expec-
tations at the same time of their decisions; therefore the guess
what others do is not obviously an exogenous variable. Sub-
jects, for instance, could have formulated their expectations in
order to avoid cognitive dissonance or to project their decision
on others. This might have played a role for some subjects,11
but it sounds unlikely that many subjects fitted their expecta-
tions to their behavior, which does not pay off, and not the
behavior to expectations, which does. 
Besides, no strong support was found for the presence of other
forms of internalized social control. Internalized in-group
selective incentives had a significant effect after controlling for
a between parts trend. Internalized out-group selective incen-
tives might be activated in a dyad with minimal contact, but it
is not a general mechanism. Its clear presence was found only
between neighbors of the opposite sex. External social control
that was introduced in a form of additional monetary incen-
tives had a significant effect. 
Contribution rates in the minimal contact condition were
highest in the medium segregation condition, which is a some-
what puzzling result. A possible explanation is that there is a
ceiling effect, which means that a presence of a single in-group
neighbor activates sufficient internalized social control to
enhance contribution to almost full certainty. This explanation
is supported by evidence of high likelihood of conflict in the
medium segregation condition (cf. Table 3). Another reason
might be that the strength of internalized social control is a
nonlinear function of the number of in-group contacts. As a
consequence, there is a marginal decrease in the segregation
11 Only one subject revealed such motivations in the post-experiment
questionnaire. 
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effect on the likelihood of intergroup conflict and medium
levels of segregation are already associated with harmful out-
comes. 
Among personal characteristics, only social orientations had
significant effects. Subjects with prosocial and egalitarian atti-
tudes were more contributive and consequently were also more
responsible for the emergence of mutually harmful outcomes
between the groups than others. Another indication of that
prosocial orientations are correlated with more generous be-
havior for the in-group, but more hostile behavior towards the
out-group, is the positive interaction effect of out-group selec-
tive incentives and prosocial orientation. This implies that sub-
jects with prosocial orientation behave more likely as local
heroes. If members of the other group surround them, they do
not surrender at all. As a macro consequence, mutually harm-
ful outcomes can occur even in the case of complete mixing, if
there are enough prosocial individuals. 
To summarize, the present study demonstrated that laboratory
experiments with minimal contact between subjects provide an
important insight for understanding network effects and the
influence of internalized social control in intergroup situations.
Results support policy arguments to promote interethnic rela-
tions and decrease segregation in order to help conflict resolu-
tion. 
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